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Territorial Tax System Reform and the Financial Behavior of Multinational 
Firms 
 
Jing Xing1, Stephen Bond2, Giorgia Maffini3 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate whether the move from the worldwide tax system to the territorial tax 
system in Japan in 2009 affected the cash-holding and financing patterns of overseas 
affiliates of Japanese multinational companies. The adoption of the territorial tax 
system substantially reduced the tax costs of dividend repatriation for overseas 
affiliates of Japanese multinationals. Based on a sample of Japanese overseas 
affiliates located in both Europe and Asia, we do not find a robust link between the 
tax costs of dividend repatriation and the cash-holdings of these overseas affiliates 
before 2009. Moreover, we do not find that Japanese overseas affiliates reduced their 
cash-holdings since the territorial tax reform, no matter whether they are located in 
countries with high tax costs of repatriation or in countries with low tax costs of 
repatriation before the reform. There is also no difference in the cash-holding patterns 
between Japanese and similar US overseas affiliates, and no evidence that financing 
patterns have differed between Japanese and similar US overseas affiliates since Japan 
moved to the territorial tax system. Our findings contribute to the debate on whether 
the policy objectives of the territorial tax system reform have been achieved. 
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1. Introduction 
 
How the corporate income tax system affects the behavior of multinational companies 
(MNCs) is one of the most important topics in international taxation. Previous studies 
find that the tax system influences MNCs’ investment, repatriation, cash holding and 
financing policies. For example, Foley et al. (2007) find that US overseas affiliates 
hold more cash in countries where the tax costs of repatriation are higher. In this study, 
we exploit the transition from the worldwide tax system to the territorial tax system in 
Japan in 2009 as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate whether and how the tax 
system affects MNCs’ cash holding and financing policies. Findings from our study 
contribute to the debate on whether the policy objectives of the territorial tax system 
reform have been achieved, and also shed light on possible outcomes of similar tax 
reforms in countries such as the United States.  
 
The territorial tax system reform in Japan in 2009 substantially reduced the tax costs 
of profit repatriation in the form of dividends for Japanese overseas affiliates. 
Previous studies based on US multinationals indicate that higher tax costs of 
repatriation are associated with more cash holdings among MNCs’ overseas affiliates. 
Moreover, researchers find that temporary tax holidays created by the American Job 
Creation Act of 2004 (the Act) effectively brought back foreign profits of US 
multinationals (Blouin and Krull, 2009; Oler et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the Act only 
provided a one-time tax holiday for multinationals to repatriate with a considerably 
lower tax rate on foreign profits. In contrast, the 2009 territorial tax system reform in 
Japan permanently reduced the tax costs of dividend repatriation and hence, it is 
unclear how multinationals would response in this situation. 
 
In this study, based on a large sample of Japanese overseas affiliates located in both 
Europe and Asia during the period 2006-2013, we first investigate whether there was 
a link between the tax costs of dividend repatriation and cash-holdings of Japanese 
overseas affiliates, as has been found regarding US MNCs. We do not find a robust 
link between the tax costs of dividend repatriation and cash holdings for Japanese 
affiliates when Japan still had the worldwide tax system: the result is sensitive 
depending on measures of cash-holdings and econometric specifications. This finding 
is in contrast to previous studies regarding US overseas affiliates such as Foley et al. 
(2007), and casts some doubt on whether Japanese MNCs are as tax aggressive as 
their US counterparts. 
 
We then investigate whether the move from the worldwide to the territorial tax system 
affected the cash holdings of Japanese overseas affiliates. For an average Japanese 
overseas affiliate, we do not observe any significant change in its cash-asset ratio 
either before or after the territorial tax system reform. We further distinguish between 
Japanese overseas affiliates located in countries which had high repatriation tax costs 
and those located in countries which had low repatriation tax costs. If the move to the 
territorial tax system affected affiliates’ repatriation decisions, it should have affected 
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the first group of affiliates more than the second group. However, we do not observe 
different cash-holding patterns between these two groups of affiliates, either before or 
after the tax reform. Moreover, we find that the cash-holding pattern of a typical 
Japanese overseas affiliate does not significantly change since the territorial tax 
system reform, relative to a control group of similar overseas affiliates of US 
multinationals. The comparison between Japanese and US overseas affiliates is 
reasonable since both countries had broadly similar worldwide tax systems before 
2009. While Japan moved to the territorial tax system in 2009, the United States has 
retained its worldwide tax system up to this date. We demonstrate similarities 
between Japanese and US overseas affiliates in observed firm-level characteristics, 
such as profitability and investment, and in the economic conditions of the home 
countries during our sample period. These findings are consistent with Hasegawa and 
Kiyota (2015), who analyze the repatriation behavior of Japanese overseas affiliates 
based on survey data and find that a typical Japanese overseas affiliate has not 
increased dividend repatriation since the territorial tax system reform.  
 
Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015) find that although the territorial tax system reform did 
not affect the repatriation behavior of Japanese affiliates on average, it was 
nonetheless successful in stimulating dividend repatriation from overseas affiliates 
which had large stocks of retained earnings before the territorial tax system reform. 
Based on our sample, we find some evidence that for Japanese affiliates which had 
accumulated a high level of cash on their balance sheets before 2009, their cash-asset 
ratio decreased after the reform, relative to affiliates that did not have large stocks of 
cash before the reform. Unlike Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015), who conducted a 
before-and-after analysis based on a sample of Japanese overseas affiliates alone, we 
compare the cash-holding behavior of Japanese overseas affiliates with similar US 
overseas affiliates. Interestingly, we find rather similar cash-holding patterns between 
“cash-rich” Japanese affiliates and “cash-rich” US affiliates, and between “cash-poor” 
Japanese affiliates and “cash-poor” US affiliates, both before and after the Japanese 
tax reform. Therefore, the relative decline in the cash-asset ratio since 2009 among 
“cash-rich” Japanese overseas affiliates, when compared with “cash-poor” Japanese 
affiliates, is likely to reflect mean reversion in cash-asset ratios rather than the 
transition from the worldwide tax system to the territorial system. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the 
background for the territorial tax system reform in Japan in 2009, and illustrate how 
the reform changed the tax costs of dividend repatriation. In Section 3, we briefly 
review existing studies on the effects of moving from the worldwide tax system to the 
territorial tax system in the United Kingdom and Japan. Section 4 explains our data 
sources and sample construction strategies. In Section 5, we present our preliminary 
empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 
4 
 
2. The 2009 territorial tax system reform in Japan: the background 
 
Until 2009, Japan taxed its resident companies’ foreign profits in a similar way as the 
United States: foreign profits of Japanese multinational companies were taxed upon 
repatriation, credits are granted for foreign taxes paid to avoid double taxation, and 
tax deferral were permitted for any unrepatriated income. Under the worldwide tax 
system, foreign profits would be subject to the corporate tax rate in Japan upon 
repatriation, which in theory implies a rather high tax burden as Japan has one of the 
highest corporate tax rates in the world. In 2008, there were reported serious 
discussions about introducing a dividend exemption system among Japan’s 
policymakers4, and Japan formally switched from the worldwide income tax system to 
the territorial tax system in March 2009 with the aim to encourage foreign profits 
repatriation and domestic investment. More specifically, effective from April 1st 2009, 
Japanese resident corporations are allowed to deduct from their taxable income 95% 
of dividends received from foreign affiliates. In order to qualify for dividend 
exemption, a parent firm must hold at least 25% of the shares of its affiliate for at 
least six months prior to the dividend declaration date.  
 
To illustrate how the 2009 territorial tax reform affects the tax costs of dividend 
repatriation, we follow the notations in Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015). Detailed 
derivations of the expressions below are provided in Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015). 
Before the reform, to receive one dollar of dividends from its affiliate i in country c in 
year t, a Japanese parent company j in the position of excess limit5 has to make net 
tax payment of 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡 as specified as below: 
 
(1)   𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡 =
𝜏𝐻𝑡 − 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡
1 − 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡
 
 
where 𝜏𝐻𝑡 is the statutory corporate tax rates of Japan in year t, and 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑐𝑡 is the 
statutory corporate tax rate in host country c in year t. Since Japan moved to the 
territorial tax system, the tax costs of dividend repatriation for the parent company j 
becomes as 0.05𝜏𝐻𝑡 + 𝑤𝑐𝑡
𝐷 , where 𝑤𝑐𝑡
𝐷  is the withholding tax rate on dividends 
repatriation imposed by the host country c in year t. Consequently, parent company j’s 
tax costs of dividend repatriation would have been substantially reduced controlling 
for the withholding tax rate. 
 
Based on this analysis, Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015) predict that Japanese overseas 
affiliates would increase their dividend repatriation following the tax system reform. 
Their empirical analyses, as discussed below, provide some qualified support for this 
                                                             
4 Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015) provide detailed discussion about the timing of the relevant policy 
discussions in 2008 before the switch to the territorial tax system was passed into law.  
5 A parent firm is in excess limit if its foreign tax payments are less than its foreign tax credit limit, 
which is calculated as the total foreign taxable income multiplied by the Japanese corporate tax rate. 
According to Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015), the majority of Japanese overseas affiliates are in excess 
limit based on their sample since Japan has one of the highest statutory corporate tax rates in the world. 
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prediction. If the reform effectively stimulates repatriation, Japanese overseas 
affiliates should also have strong incentives to delay repatriation from shortly before 
2009 to after the territorial system came into effect (April, 2009). Such responses 
should be reflected in the cash-holdings of Japanese affiliates, which is the main focus 
of this study.  
 
3. Existing evidence on the effects of the territorial tax system reforms 
 
Both Japan and the United Kingdom moved from the worldwide tax system to the 
territorial tax system in 2009. However, only a small number of studies have 
investigated the effects of the transition to the territorial tax system on MNCs’ 
repatriation and investment behavior. Nonetheless, existing studies differ considerably 
in terms of data sources and methodologies, and in this section we briefly review 
these studies in those aspects and discuss their empirical findings. 
 
Regarding the effects of the territorial tax system reform on repatriation, Egger et al. 
(2015) examine whether dividend repatriation increased significantly from overseas 
affiliates of UK MNCs after the UK moved to the territorial tax system. Using 
Amadeus affiliate-level data, Egger et al. (2015) compare UK-owned overseas 
affiliates and non-UK-owned ones based on propensity scores that are estimated from 
a multivariate location choice model. Egger et al. (2015) find that the average 
treatment effect of the territorial tax system reform on the UK-owned overseas 
affiliates’ dividends repatriation is more than US$2 million, which is both statistically 
and economically significant.  
 
In comparison, the evidence on the effects of the territorial tax reform on the dividend 
repatriation behavior of Japanese overseas affiliates is less clear-cut. In contrast to 
Egger et al. (2015), who infer dividend repatriation indirectly from affiliates’ balance 
sheets provided by Amadeus, Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015) directly observe the actual 
dividend repatriation of MNCs from The Survey of Overseas Business Activities, 
which is a comprehensive survey of overseas affiliates of Japanese MNCs conducted 
by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI). Hasegawa and 
Kiyota (2015) use a before-and-after analysis framework, which compares the 
dividend repatriation of Japanese overseas affiliates before and after the 2009 
territorial tax system reform. They find that for a typical Japanese overseas affiliate, 
the territorial tax system reform did not lead to a higher level of dividend 
repatriation.6 However, once they distinguish between affiliates with a large stock of 
retained earnings7 in the pre-2009 period and those with a small stock of retained 
earnings during the pre-reform period, they find that only “cash-rich” affiliates 
increased dividend repatriation after the 2009 reform. Insofar as the reform aimed to 
                                                             
6 Neither did the dividend repatriation of Japanese overseas affiliates become less sensitive to the tax 
rate differences between Japan and foreign countries, or more sensitive to the withholding tax rate in 
the host countries, post the reform. 
7 The stock of retained earnings is reported in The Survey of Overseas Business Activities. 
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bring back foreign profits of overseas affiliates that had accumulated a large stock of 
unused profits, Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015) conclude that the 2009 territorial tax 
system reform in Japan was successful in achieving this goal. 
 
Different from Egger et al. (2015) and Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015), who use 
affiliate-level unconsolidated data, Arena and Kutner (2015) use Worldscope data 
which are based on consolidated financial statements of large listed companies to 
analyze the effects of the territorial tax system reform on the behavior of both UK and 
Japanese MNCs. However, Arena and Kutner (2015) focus on how the transition from 
the worldwide tax system to the territorial tax system affected how much dividend 
these companies pay out to their shareholders, rather than how such transition affected 
the intra-group dividend repatriation. In this sense, Arena and Kutner (2015) is rather 
different from Egger et al. (2015) and Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015). Arena and 
Kutner (2015) find that both UK and Japanese multinationals were more likely to pay 
out and also paid out more dividends to their shareholders in the period 2009–2011 
when the tax costs of repatriating earnings were reduced. Nonetheless, Arena and 
Kutner (2015) find that the move to the territorial tax system did not lead to a higher 
level of domestic investment by the multinational companies.  
 
All the aforementioned studies use firm-level data in their analysis. In contrast, 
Matheson et al. (2013) use aggregated bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) data to 
investigate the effects of the UK territorial tax reform on outbound FDI. Matheson et 
al. (2013) find that UK outbound FDI became more sensitive to the corporate income 
tax rate in the host countries after the territorial tax system reform. However, the 
increased sensitivity of UK outbound FDI to the local corporate tax rate is more 
robust for FDI financed by new equity than for FDI financed by retained earnings. 
 
We focus on the effects of the 2009 territorial reform in Japan in this study. Previous 
studies provide mixed results regarding the efficacy of the territorial tax system 
reform on MNCs’ dividend repatriation, cash-holding, and investment behavior. 
Therefore, further investigation is required to fully understand the effects of moving 
from the worldwide tax system to the territorial tax system. Moreover, apart from 
Egger at al. (2015), previous studies are mostly based on a before-and-after analysis. 
It is worth noting that the territorial tax system reform in Japan and the UK both took 
effect in 2009, which coincides with the global financial crisis around that time. 
Without fully controlling for any macro-economic conditions that also affect MNCs’ 
corporate policies, it is therefore difficult to separate out the effects of the territorial 
tax system reforms from the effects of the economic crisis. As discussed below, in 
addition to controlling for observed macro-economic fluctuations explicitly, our 
approach is to compare the behavior of Japanese overseas affiliates with that of US 
overseas affiliates, provided that they are located in the same host country and are 
similar in observed firm-level characteristics to their Japanese counterparts. This 
comparison is reasonable as the system of taxation of overseas activities was quite 
similar in Japan and the US before 2009 (Slemrod, 1991). This 
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Difference-in-Difference analysis is reasonable also because, as we show, the 
macro-economic conditions are similar in Japan and the US during the sample period 
(2005-2013). By comparing affiliates located in the same host country, we fully 
control for economic conditions in the host countries. Our analysis based on this 
Difference-in-Differences approach indicates insignificant effects of the territorial tax 
system reform on the behavior of Japanese MNCs, contrary to what existing studies 
have suggested (e.g., Hasegawa and Kiyota, 2015).  
 
4. Data and samples 
 
We collect affiliate-level financial statements of Japanese multinationals from 
Amadeus and Oriana, both of which are products of the Bureau van Dijk (BvD). 
These two databases provide balance sheet and income statement information at the 
affiliate level for Japanese affiliates located in Europe and Asia. The data covers the 
period 2006-2013.  
 
To identify whether a firm in the databases is an overseas affiliate of a Japanese MNC, 
we rely on ownership information provided in the databases.8 Specifically, we select 
firms that operate in Europe or Asia that are more than 50% owned by a Japanese 
parent company. The 50% ownership is a rather strict requirement but sufficient to 
ensure that the selected firms are owned by a Japanese MNC. Moreover, the 50% 
ownership ensures that preferential tax treatment in tax treaties, such as reduced 
withholding tax rates, generally apply. We exclude affiliates in the financial and 
insurance industries following the convention in the literature. 
 
We then collect the unconsolidated financial statements of the affiliates to construct 
the dependent and explanatory variables. To measure firms’ cash holding policies, we 
follow Foley et al. (2007) to construct the natural logarithm of the cash-net asset ratio, 
which equals log[Cash/(Total Assets-Cash)]. However, we use alternative measures of 
cash-holdings, including the level of the cash-net asset ratio, and the level of the 
cash-asset ratio, as robustness checks.  
 
To capture the tax costs of dividend repatriation, we follow Hasegawa and Kiyota 
(2015) to construct a variable TAX, which equals 
𝜏𝐻−𝜏𝐶
1−𝜏𝐶
 as specified in Equation 1, 
where 𝜏𝐻 is the corporate income tax rate in Japan and 𝜏𝑐 is that in the host country. 
Information about tax rates in the host and home countries are provided by the Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation. We expect the cash-assets ratio of overseas 
affiliates of Japanese MNCs to be positively correlated with TAX before 2009 since 
everything else equal, higher tax costs of repatriation would deter profits repatriation 
and lead to more cash holdings abroad for MNCs. It is worth noting that TAX is 
                                                             
8 One caveat is that ownership information is only available in the most recent year when a firm has an 
account in Amadeus or Oriana. Therefore, we cannot track the changes in the ownership structure over 
time. 
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constructed as if Japan kept its worldwide tax system throughout the whole sample 
period. As this tax cost of repatriation is no longer relevant since the 2009 territorial 
tax system reform, we expect the correlation between the cash-assets ratio and TAX 
to disappear in the post-reform period. 
 
We control for a set of firm-level characteristics in our regression analyses of the 
cash-holding behavior of Japanese foreign affiliates. Following the literature on 
companies’ cash-holding policies, we control for firm size, profitability, tangibility, 
leverage, growth rate of revenue and growth rate of fixed assets when we investigate 
the cash-holding behavior. We use the natural logarithm of revenue as a proxy for firm 
size.9 We use the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to total assets as a 
proxy for profitability. We use the share of tangible fixed assets in total assets to proxy 
for tangibility. We further control for the growth rate of revenue at the affiliate level, 
and for the growth rate of fixed assets which is a proxy for the investment rate. These 
firm-level characteristics are constructed using financial statement information 
provided by Amadeus and Oriana. 
 
As discussed previously, to identify the effects of the territorial tax system reform, it 
is crucial to control for macro-economic conditions that affect MNCs’ repatriation and 
financing patterns. Specifically, we include the annual GDP growth rates of the host 
countries as a control for local macro-economic fluctuations. The GDP growth rates 
are provided by the WDI database from the World Bank. Moreover, we include in the 
estimations a set of industry dummies to control for industry-specific fixed effects. 
 
After collecting all necessary variables, we deal with outliers using standard 
procedures. More specifically, we delete observations with a cash-asset ratio or a 
leverage ratio below zero or above unity. We exclude firm-year observations with 
negative total assets or negative equity. We then drop observations at the top or 
bottom one percent of the distributions of firm size, tangibility, profitability, growth 
rate of revenue and growth rate of fixed assets. In our benchmark analyses, we obtain 
a total of 14,184 firm-year observations for overseas affiliates of Japanese MNCs 
during 2006-2013. To conduct the Difference-in-Differences analysis, we use a 
smaller but more balanced sample which requires each affiliate to have non-missing 
observations in all necessary variables during 2006-2011. This smaller sample 
contains a total of 7,625 firm-year observations. 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of key variables for firms in our sample. When 
presenting these statistics, we use the full sample, the pre-reform sample, and the 
post-reform sample, separately. The upper part of Table 1 provides statistics of the key 
variables for all Japanese overseas affiliates in the sample. The lower part of Table 1 
provides statistics for the smaller but more balanced panel of affiliates with 
                                                             
9 In unreported exercises, we also use the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size and 
the results are similar. We do not use this alternative measure of firm size in the benchmark analysis as 
there is an automatic negative correlation between total assets and the cash-assets ratio if there is any 
measurement error in total assets. 
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non-missing observations during 2006-2011. Based on these descriptive statistics, 
there is no significant change in terms of affiliates’ cash-net asset ratio or cash-asset 
ratio before and after the territorial tax reform. However, we observe a substantial 
drop in firms’ profitability, growth rate of revenue and growth rate of fixed assets 
since 2009, which indicates the effects of the recent financial crisis. 
 
Table 2 provides the list of the top 27 locations for Japanese affiliates based on our 
sample. For each host country, we provide the number of observations and the sample 
frequencies. We also calculate the average tax costs of dividend repatriation, 
according to Equation 1, during the pre-reform period (2006-2008) for each of these 
host countries. During the sample period, all host countries in our sample have a 
lower corporate tax rate than that in Japan. There is also considerable variation in 
terms of the tax costs of dividend repatriation across host countries: the tax burden of 
repatriation is much higher among Eastern European countries relative to countries 
with higher corporate tax rates such as France, Germany, and Italy. 
 
5. Benchmark results 
 
5.1. Graphical analyses 
 
In this section, we provide graphical analyses regarding key variables of interest. We 
start with analysis of the cash-holding patterns of Japanese foreign affiliates. Figure 1 
illustrates the time-series evolution of the average cash-net asset ratio for Japanese 
overseas affiliates during the period 2006-2013 based on the full sample and on the 
more balanced sample, respectively. If Japanese overseas affiliates responded to the 
tax reform by delaying dividend repatriation from shortly before the reform, we are 
likely to observe an increase in their cash-net asset ratio just before 2009 and a 
decrease after the tax reform. However, there is no visual evidence in Figure 1 that a 
typical Japanese foreign affiliate increased its cash-net asset ratio shortly before the 
tax reform, and the average cash-net asset ratio of Japanese foreign affiliates actually 
increased slightly in 2009 and 2010. The average cash-net asset ratio dipped in 2011 
but it went up again in 2012 and 2013. The line for the full sample and the line for the 
more balanced sample move closely with each other, which suggest little sample 
composition effect.  
 
Nevertheless, the territorial tax system reform is likely to have affected affiliates 
located in countries with high repatriation tax costs more than affiliates located in 
countries with low repatriation tax costs. To investigate this hypothesis, we define a 
host country as having high repatriation tax costs if the average value of TAX, 
calculated according to Equation 1, in this host country during the period 2006-2008 
is above the corresponding sample median. We then plot in Figure 2A the time-series 
of the average cash-net asset ratio for affiliates located in countries with high and low 
repatriation tax costs, separately. The two time series move closely together until 2011 
and the average cash-net asset ratio increased for affiliates located in countries with 
10 
 
high repatriation tax costs in 2012 and 2013. Figure 2A lends little support for the 
hypothesis that the territorial tax system reform affects the cash-holding behavior of 
Japanese overseas affiliates, even of those located in countries with high tax costs of 
repatriation before the reform.  
 
It is worth noting that in Figure 2A, we do not observe a higher cash-net asset ratio for 
Japanese affiliates located in countries with higher repatriation tax costs, which is in 
contrast to previous studies regarding US foreign affiliates. Nonetheless, in Figure 2B, 
we control for industry-specific fixed effects while plotting the average cash-net asset 
ratio over time and it is clear in Figure 2B that on average, Japanese affiliates in high 
repatriation cost countries accumulate more cash than affiliates in the same industry 
but located in low repatriation cost countries. However, even in Figure 2B, there is 
little evidence that affiliates in high repatriation cost countries increased their cash 
holdings shortly before 2009 and reduced cash holdings after 2009. In fact, we 
observe a significant increase in the cash-net asset ratio among affiliates in high 
repatriation cost countries in 2012 and 2013, which is hard to reconcile with the claim 
that the transition from the worldwide to the territorial tax system stimulates more 
foreign profits repatriation.10  
 
One possibility is that Japanese affiliates, especially those located in high repatriation 
tax cost countries, did respond to the tax reform by delaying their dividend 
repatriation from shortly before 2009 but instead of holding unrepatriated profits as 
cash, they used these profits to reduce debt or to temporarily increase holdings of 
financial assets such as government bonds before 2009. These possible scenarios are 
rational behaviour of a profit-maximizing firm if external financing is more costly 
than retained earnings or if short-term financial assets yield a higher return than cash. 
If so, we might not observe any change in the cash-holding patterns of Japanese 
foreign affiliates. Instead, we should either observe a dip in the leverage ratio or an 
increase in the ratio of financial assets to total assets shortly before 2009. To explore 
these possibilities, Figure 3 plots the time-series of the average leverage ratio, defined 
as long-term debt divided by net assets, for affiliates located in high and low 
repatriation tax cost countries, respectively.11 We do not observe a reduction in the 
leverage ratio shortly before the tax reform for either of the two groups of affiliates. 
Figure 4 plots the time-series of average non-fixed assets as a share of total assets 
over time, which is a proxy for the holdings of financial assets. There is no evidence 
that Japanese affiliates increased their holdings of financial assets shortly before 2009.  
 
To summarize, graphical analyses in this section suggest that the transition from the 
worldwide to the territorial tax system did not cause significant changes in Japanese 
                                                             
10 The increase in the cash-net asset ratio for affiliates located in high repatriation cost countries is not 
due to changes in the sample composition after 2011. Similar pattern is observed when we use a 
strongly balanced panel to plot the graph. 
11 We have also plotted the time-series of alternative measures of the leverage ratio, such as total 
long-term debt and short-term debt divided by net assets and, total liabilities divided by total assets. 
There is no significant change in these alternative measures of leverage either. 
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overseas affiliates’ cash holding behaviour either before or after the reform. Since we 
do not observe significant change in Japanese foreign affiliates’ leverage ratio or 
holdings of financial assets, it is also unlikely that the reform has affected these 
affiliates’ dividend repatriation behaviour. 
 
5.2 Regression analyses 
 
5.2.1. Do Japanese foreign affiliates hold more cash in countries with higher 
repatriation tax costs? 
 
We first analyze whether there is a link between the tax costs of dividend repatriation 
and cash-holding behavior of overseas affiliates of Japanese MNCs. Specifically, we 
estimate Equation 2: 
 
(2)𝑙𝑛
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
= α + βTAX𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋
′
𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿0𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 
 
+𝛿2𝜑′𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
where 𝑙𝑛
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
 is the natural logarithm of the cash-net asset ratio as defined in 
Section 4 for affiliate i located in country j in year t. TAX𝑗,𝑡 measures the tax costs of 
dividend repatriation from an affiliate in host country j in year t. In the regressions, 
TAX𝑗,𝑡 is constructed as if Japan kept its worldwide tax system throughout the whole 
sample period. 𝑋′𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is a vector of firm-level characteristics including size, tangibility, 
profitability, leverage, growth rate of revenue and growth rate of fixed assets. 
𝐺𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 is the GDP growth rate in host country j in year t. We include a set of year 
dummies to control for common business cycle effects. 𝜑′𝑖 is a set of industry 
dummies, which is fixed for each firm over time. 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the unobserved error term. 
 
To test whether the link between TAX and the cash-holding behavior changed since 
the 2009 tax reform, we split the whole sample to two sub-samples: 2006-2008, and 
2009-2013. We report in Table 3 the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation results 
of Equation 2 based on the two sub-samples. In Column 1, we estimate the association 
between TAX and the cash-net asset ratio during 2006-2008 while only controlling for 
year dummies and industry dummies. Consistent with previous studies of US overseas 
affiliates, we find a positive association between the tax costs of dividend repatriation 
and Japanese overseas affiliates’ cash-net asset ratio (in logs) before 2009, which is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
In Column 2, we include firm-level characteristics and the GDP growth rate in host 
countries. We continue to find a positive and significant link between TAX and the log 
of the cash-net asset ratio using this specification. Regarding the firm-level 
characteristics, we find that on average, smaller affiliates hold more cash, which is 
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consistent with the precautionary motives for holding cash. More tangible firms hold 
less cash, and more profitable firms hold more cash, which are both consistent with 
the literature. Unsurprisingly, more levered firms hold less cash as they need to meet 
more debt obligations. We also find a negative, albeit not statistically significant, 
relationship between the growth rate of revenue and cash-assets ratio. The negative 
sign of this coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis that fast-growing firms would 
invest more and hence hold less cash.  
 
In Columns 3-4, we repeat the regressions as in Columns 1-2 using data for the period 
2009-2013. Since we measure TAX during this post-reform period as if Japan did not 
move from the worldwide system to the territorial system, we expect to see no link 
between TAX and the cash-net asset ratio (in logs) during the post-reform period. In 
both columns, however, we continue to find a positive and significant association 
between TAX and the cash-net asset ratio (in logs), even though the territorial tax 
system reform removed much of the tax costs of dividend repatriation. This result is 
somewhat puzzling. One possible explanation is that the cash-net asset ratio is highly 
persistent within firms over time. It is also possible that our estimations pick up 
effects on the cash-net asset ratio (in logs) from non-tax factors which vary across 
host countries, and which happen to be correlated with TAX. 
 
We use alternative measures of cash-holdings as the dependent variable in Columns 
5-8. Specifically, we use the level of the cash-net asset ratio in Columns 5-6, and the 
level of the cash-asset ratio in Columns 7-8. We continue to find a positive association 
between TAX and these alternative measures of cash-holdings. However, with these 
alternative specifications the coefficient on TAX is significantly different from zero 
only in the post-reform period in Column 8. Based on Table 3, it is then hard to 
conclude that there is any strong and robust association between the tax costs of 
repatriation and the cash-holdings of Japanese overseas affiliates even before 2009. 
One implication of these results is that Japanese overseas affiliates may not be as tax 
aggressive as we expected, or as tax aggressive as foreign affiliates of US MNCs. 
 
5.2.2 Does the territorial tax reform affect the cash-holdings of Japanese foreign 
affiliates? 
 
Our graphical analyses in Section 5.1 provide no evidence that an average Japanese 
overseas affiliate delayed profit reparation shortly before 2009 and subsequently 
reduced its cash holdings since the territorial tax system reform. In this section, we 
use econometric approaches to formally test whether the tax reform had a 
heterogeneous influence on different types of affiliates.  
 
Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015) find that the territorial tax reform in Japan is effective in 
stimulating dividend repatriation from cash-rich affiliates. Based on this finding, they 
conclude that the 2009 reform succeeded in achieving its policy objectives. We first 
test whether their finding can be reflected in affiliate-level cash-holdings based on our 
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sample. Similar to Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015), we define cash-rich affiliates to be 
those with an average cash-assets ratio during the period 2006-2008 above the 
corresponding sample median level, and the rest as cash-poor affiliates.  
 
We plot the time-series of the average cash-net asset ratio for cash-rich and cash-poor 
Japanese affiliates in Figure 5. We observe an increase in the cash-net asset ratio for 
the cash-poor firms since 2009: the average cash-net asset ratio before the 2009 
reform is around 3% and it increased to above 6% by 2013. This result suggests that 
cash-poor affiliates may have become rather cautious since the financial crisis and 
consequently hold more cash out of precautionary motives. In contrast, we observe 
little change in the cash-net asset ratio for cash-rich affiliates between 2006 and 2010. 
There was a slight reduction in the cash-net asset ratio for cash-rich affiliates in 2011. 
However, their cash-net asset ratio picked up again in 2012 and 2013. 
 
To formally test whether the patterns of cash-holdings are different between cash-rich 
and cash-poor affiliates since Japan moved to the territorial tax system, we construct a 
dummy variable HighCash which equals 1 for cash-rich affiliates and 0 otherwise. We 
also construct a dummy variable POST which equals 1 since the year 2009. We 
estimate Equation 3 as follows12: 
 
(3)𝑙𝑛
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
= α + β0HighCash𝑖 + β1POST𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋
′
𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
+𝛿0𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛿2𝜑′𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
β1 would be negative if cash-rich affiliates repatriate more and consequently reduce 
cash-holdings by more after the territorial tax system reform. We use the log of the 
cash-net asset ratio as the dependent variable here and in all subsequent regressions, 
but results are rather similar when we use alternative measures of cash-holdings. We 
estimate Equation 3 using both the OLS and the Within-groups (WG) estimators, and 
the results are reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. Unsurprisingly, we find that 
cash-rich affiliates held more cash on their balance sheets before 2009, as indicated by 
the positive estimated coefficient β0. The estimated coefficient β1 is negative and 
strongly significant, suggesting that the cash-net asset ratio decreased among 
cash-rich affiliates relative to cash-poor affiliates during 2009-2013. These findings 
are consistent with Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015) that cash-rich affiliates repatriated 
more back to Japan since 2009 compared with cash-poor affiliates. 
 
It is worth noting that in Figure 5 we observe an increase in the cash-net asset ratio for 
cash-poor affiliates since 2009 while that of cash-rich affiliates remains relatively 
stable. Therefore, mean reversion may also explain such convergence between the two 
types of affiliates, which is an issue that we will further investigate in Section 5.2.3. A 
                                                             
12 Since we include a set of year dummies in Equation 3, we do not include the POST dummy in the 
regression specification. 
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more direct test of the effects of the tax reform, however, is to compare the 
cash-holdings of affiliates located in high repatriation tax cost countries with those in 
low repatriation tax cost countries. If the tax reform truly affects the cash-holdings of 
Japanese foreign affiliates, we should see a more pronounced reduction in the 
cash-asset ratio after the reform for the first type of affiliates. To investigate this issue, 
we use the following Difference-in-Differences approach: we construct a dummy 
variable HighTax that equals 1 for affiliates located in countries which had high 
repatriation tax costs, and 0 otherwise, and then we estimate Equation 4 below: 
 
(4)𝑙𝑛
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
= α + β0HighTax𝑖 + β1POST𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋
′
𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
+𝛿0𝐺𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛿2𝜑′𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
β1 should be negative if our hypothesis is correct. We report the OLS and WG 
estimation results based on Equation 4 in Columns 3-4 of Table 4. In Appendix A, we 
compare firm-level characteristics between affiliates in high repatriation tax cost and 
those in low repatriation tax cost.  
 
In Table 4, the estimated coefficient β1  is positive in the OLS estimation and 
negative in the WG estimation, but neither of these estimates is statistically significant. 
Therefore, our econometric analysis does not suggest that the territorial tax system 
reform lead to reduced cash holdings by Japanese overseas affiliates in host countries 
where the repatriation tax cost was previously high, compared to those in host 
countries where the repatriation tax cost was previously low. 
 
5.2.3 Comparing Japanese and US overseas affiliates 
 
To understand whether the 2009 territorial tax system reform in Japan is really 
effective in stimulating foreign profits repatriation and hence in reducing the level of 
foreign cash holding, we nonetheless need to find a counterfactual. The 
before-and-after framework, as adopted in Hasegawa and Kiyota (2015), cannot rule 
out the possibility that something fundamental changed in host countries or in Japan 
at the same time as the tax reform was implemented, and these unobserved changes 
can affect the cash-holdings of Japanese overseas affiliates. This is a legitimate 
concern given the global financial crisis happening around the same time. Moreover, 
although we observe different cash-holding patterns between cash-rich and cash-poor 
affiliates, it is possible that these are due to differences in the underlying trends 
between the two types of firms.  
 
To address this issue, we compare the cash-holding patterns of Japanese and US 
overseas affiliates, provided that these affiliates are located in the same host country 
and exhibit similar firm-level characteristics. The comparison between Japanese and 
US overseas affiliates is reasonable since the two countries share many similarities in 
terms of their international tax system (Slemrod, 1991) before 2009. While Japan 
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moved from the worldwide tax system in 2009, the US remains in the worldwide 
system up to this date. Moreover, the two countries have close economic ties with 
each other. Since we compare affiliates located in the same host country, any 
unobserved shocks in the host country should have similar effects on the cash holding 
behaviors of both Japanese and US overseas affiliates. 
 
To conduct this comparison, we focus on host countries where we observe both 
Japanese and US overseas affiliates.13 Figures 6A-6E provide graphical comparisons 
between foreign affiliates of Japanese and US MNCs in terms of their average 
cash-net asset ratios. We conduct the comparisons based on the full sample (Figure 
6A), the sample of affiliates in high repatriation tax cost countries (Figure 6B), the 
sample of affiliates in low repatriation tax cost countries (Figure 6C), the sample of 
cash-rich affiliates (Figure 6D), and the sample of cash-poor affiliates (Figure 6E).  
Strikingly, comparing Figure 6D and 6E, we see a similar pattern of convergence after 
2009 between the (previously) cash-rich and cash-poor affiliates of US MNCs as for 
affiliates of Japanese MNCs. In Appendix B, we also compare the GDP growth rate in 
Japan with that in the US, and firm-level characteristics of Japanese and US affiliates 
including firms size, profitability, tangibility, growth rate of turnover, and growth rate 
of fixed assets. In all these figures, we find that Japanese and US affiliates are 
reasonably similar. 
 
We then conduct the Difference-in-Differences estimation, for each of the 
comparisons between Japanese and US foreign affiliates, based on Equation 5: 
 
(5)𝑙𝑛
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
= α + β0Treated𝑖 + β1POST𝑡 × Treated𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋
′
𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
+𝛿0𝐺𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿1𝐺𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠+𝛿3𝜑′𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
where Treated𝑖 equals 1 if affiliate i belongs to a Japanese MNC, and 0 if it is an US 
overseas affiliate. In addition to the set of year dummies, we control here for the GDP 
growth rates in Japan and the US. We first estimate Equation 5 using the OLS 
estimator while controlling for host-country dummies. We report the results in Table 
5A. Based on the full sample (Column 1), we do not find that a typical Japanese 
overseas affiliate reduces its cash-net asset ratio post the tax system reform, relative to 
a typical US overseas affiliate located in the same host country: the estimated 
coefficient β1 is not significantly different from zero.  
 
In Columns 2 and 3, we distinguish between affiliates located in high repatriation tax 
cost countries (Column 2) and those in low repatriation tax cost countries (Column 3). 
Relative to US overseas affiliates, we do not find that Japanese affiliates reduced their 
cash-net asset ratio after the territorial tax system reform, no matter where they are 
located. In Columns 4 and 5, we distinguish between cash-rich (Column 4) and 
cash-poor affiliates (Column 5). Interestingly, relative to cash-rich US overseas 
                                                             
13 This slightly reduces the number of Japanese affiliates. 
16 
 
affiliates, we do not find that cash-rich Japanese affiliates reduced their cash-holdings 
after the reform: the estimated coefficient β1is actually positive and significant. The 
change in the cash-asset ratio of cash-poor Japanese overseas affiliates after the tax 
reform is also similar to that of cash-poor US overseas affiliates. These results suggest 
that the difference between cash-rich and cash-poor Japanese affiliates that we 
observe in Table 4 (Columns 1 and 2) is unlikely to be driven by the territorial tax 
system reform and is more likely to be due to mean reversion. 
 
We re-estimate Equation 5 using the WG estimator and report the results in Table 5B. 
Throughout the columns apart from Column 4, we do not observe any significant 
treatment effect: the estimated coefficient β1 is not statistically different from zero. 
In Column 4 when we compare cash-rich Japanese and cash-rich US affiliates, we 
find that cash-rich Japanese affiliates increase their cash-holdings relative to the US 
affiliates (as in Column 4 of Table 5A).  
 
To summarize the results in Table 5A and Table 5B, we do not find that overseas 
affiliates of Japanese MNCs cut their cash-asset ratio after 2008 relative to similar US 
affiliates, no matter where the affiliate is located, and whether the affiliate was rich in 
cash or not before the reform. These comparisons between Japanese and similar US 
counterparts cast further doubt on whether the transition from the worldwide tax 
system to the territorial tax system significantly affected the cash holding patterns of 
Japanese overseas affiliates. 
 
5.2.4 Effects of the reform on Japanese overseas affiliates’ financing patterns 
 
In this section, we investigate whether the 2009 territorial tax reform in Japan has 
affected the financing patterns of overseas affiliates of Japanese MNCs. Earlier 
studies show that the choice between intra-firm equity and intra-firm debt financing of 
multinational firms, especially, is strongly sensitive to the corporate tax system (Desai 
et al., 2004; Huizinga et al., 2008; and Buettner et al., 2012). Following the territorial 
tax system reform, intra-firm equity financing would be the preferred way of 
financing for Japanese overseas affiliates since dividend repatriation is mostly 
untaxed while repatriation in the form of interests is still taxed. If this is true, we 
should observe that Japanese foreign affiliates cut their leverage ratio after the 
reform.14 As our sample covers a number of years since the territorial tax system 
reform, affiliates should have adjusted their capital structure given the time, even if 
leverage is sticky.  
 
To measure firms’ financing patterns, we adopt three different proxies: the ratio of 
long-term debt to total assets (minus cash), the sum of long-term and short-term debt 
divided by total assets (minus cash), and the sum of long-term and short-term debt 
                                                             
14 It is worth noting that we do not observe the amount of internal debt from our data sources and 
instead, we only observe the amount of total borrowing which might include external borrowing. 
However, if intra-debt financing is reduced after the reform, we should observe a reduction in the 
overall leverage all else equal. 
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divided by the sum of both types of debt and equity (minus cash). We exclude cash 
and cash equivalent from the denominators of all three measures so that our analysis 
of affiliates’ financing patterns would not be confounded by changes in their 
cash-holding behavior. 
 
In Figure 7, we plot the time-series of the average ratio of long-term debt to total net 
assets during the sample period for Japanese and US overseas affiliates in our 
sample.15 Figure 7 shows that although there is a slight decline in the leverage ratio 
for Japanese overseas affiliates, the trends in the leverage ratio are rather similar 
between Japanese and US overseas affiliates during the sample period.  
 
We formally test whether the leverage ratio of Japanese and US overseas affiliates 
evolves differently after 2009 using the Difference-in-Differences approach based on 
Equation 6: 
 
(6)𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = α + β0Treated𝑖 + β1POST𝑡 × Treated𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋′𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿0𝐺𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡
+ 𝛿1𝐺𝑅_𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛿3𝜑′𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
Treated𝑖 is a dummy that equals 1 for Japanese overseas affiliates and 0 otherwise. 
We use different proxies for the leverage ratio as the dependent variable. The OLS 
and WG estimation results are reported in Table 6. The estimated treatment effect 
(coefficient β1) has a negative sign in most columns but none of these point estimates 
is statistically significant. Based on this comparison, we do not find that the territorial 
tax reform in Japan affects the capital structure of Japanese overseas affiliates.  
 
6. Conclusions and discussions 
 
In this study, we investigate whether the transition from the worldwide tax system to 
the territorial tax system in Japan in 2009 affected the cash holdings of overseas 
affiliates of Japanese multinationals. Using a Difference-in-Differences approach to 
compare Japanese overseas affiliates located in high repatriation tax cost countries 
and those located in low repatriation tax cost countries, and to compare Japanese 
overseas affiliates with similar US counterparts, we do not find that the tax reform 
significantly changed the cash-holding behaviour of Japanese overseas affiliates. Our 
findings cast some doubt on the effectiveness of the tax reform in achieving its policy 
objective.  
 
A few issues are worth further investigation. First, if the territorial tax system reform 
did not affect the repatriation and cash-holding behaviour of Japanese overseas 
affiliates, it implies a reduced tax burden on repatriated foreign profits for the parent 
companies in Japan. Therefore, it would be important to analyze whether Japanese 
multinationals invested after the reform or paid out higher dividends to their 
                                                             
15 We also use the other two measures of the leverage ratio and conduct similar exercises. The findings 
are similar. 
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shareholders (as supported by the findings of Arena and Kutner, 2015). Second, the 
United Kingdom also moved from the worldwide tax system to the territorial system 
in 2009, and it is interesting to investigate whether the reform affected the behaviour 
of UK multinationals. Third, we have used overseas affiliates of US multinationals as 
the counterpart in our Difference-in-Differences analysis. Although the US is a 
reasonable counterpart, it would be helpful to use other countries such as those in 
Europe as an alternative counterpart as robustness checks. Finally, in our analyses we 
have not investigated the effects of the withholding tax rates on the behaviour of the 
multinationals. All these issues require further research. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (full sample, 2006-2008, and 2009-2013) 
 
All firms pooled together 
 Full sample 2006-2008 2009-2013 
Variable         Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Cash
Total assets − Cash
 
14,184 0.209 4,356 0.207 9,828 0.210 
 [0.359]  [0.359]  [0.359] 
Cash
Total assets
 
14,184 0.131 4,356 0.129 9,828 0.131 
 [0.153]  [0.153]  [0.152] 
Size 14,184 16.041 4,356 16.607 9,828 15.789 
  [3.451]  [3.130]  [3.555] 
Tangibility 14,184 0.179 4,356 0.176 9,828 0.180 
  [0.210]  [0.209]  [0.210] 
Profitability 14,184 0.058 4,356 0.070 9,828 0.052 
  [0.115]  [0.117]  [0.113] 
Long − term debt
Net assets
 
14,184 0.040 4,356 0.042 9,828 0.039 
  [0.120]  [0.123]  [0.119] 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 14,184 0.169 4,356 0.214 9,828 0.149 
  [0.619]  [0.651]  [0.602] 
∆𝐹𝐴 14,184 0.183 4,356 0.240 9,828 0.158 
  [1.010]  [1.110]  [0.961] 
Firms with non-missing observations during 2006-2011 
 Full sample 2006-2008 2009-2013 
Variable Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Cash
Total assets − Cash
 
7,625 0.186 2,913 0.181 4,712 0.189 
 [0.331]  [0.309]  [0.343] 
Cash
Total assets
 
7,625 0.118 2,913 0.118 4,712 0.118 
  [0.146]  [0.142]  [0.148] 
Size 7,625 17.246 2,913 17.206 4,712 17.271 
  [2.638]  [2.724]  [2.583] 
Tangibility 7,625 0.172 2,913 0.177 4,712 0.168 
  [0.204]  [0.209]  [0.200] 
Profitability 7,625 0.056 2,913 0.070 4,712 0.047 
  [0.105]  [0.107]  [0.103] 
Long − term debt
Net assets
 
7,625 0.036 2,913 0.040 4,712 0.034 
 [0.112]  [0.118]  [0.108] 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 7,625 0.113 2,913 0.177 4,712 0.073 
  [0.434]  [0.525]  [0.362] 
∆𝐹𝐴 7,625 0.157 2,913 0.237 4,712 0.108 
  [0.927]  [1.083]  [0.812] 
Notes: ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 is the growth rate of revenue, ∆𝐹𝐴 is the growth rate of fixed assets. Definitions 
and constructions of variables are provided in Section 4. Standard deviations are provided in the 
brackets. 
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Table 2: Distribution of Japanese affiliates across major host countries and 
average tax costs of dividend repatriation during 2006-2008 
 
Country Obs. 
Frequency 
(%) 𝑇𝐴𝑋̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Country Obs. 
Frequency 
(%) 𝑇𝐴𝑋̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
DE 2,286 16.12 0.106 AU 347 2.45 0.153 
FR 2,157 15.21 0.096 AT 218 1.54 0.210 
KR 1,410 9.94 0.182 HU 163 1.15 0.257 
IT 1,105 7.79 0.083 PT 143 1.01 0.170 
BE 932 6.57 0.102 NO 143 1.01 0.177 
CN 903 6.37 0.180 NL 141 0.99 0.191 
PH 743 5.24 0.088 IN 137 0.97 0.113 
ES 652 4.60 0.043 RO 133 0.94 0.294 
CZ 637 4.49 0.231 SK 132 0.93 0.268 
PL 568 4.00 0.268 FI 116 0.82 0.199 
RU 372 2.62 0.220 UA 71 0.50 0.210 
SE 361 2.55 0.177     
Notes: We list the top 27 destinations for Japanese overseas affiliates in our sample. 
United Kingdom and New Zealand would be among the list of top destinations but we 
exclude both countries from the regression analysis since both UK and New Zealand 
experienced transition from the worldwide to territorial tax system during the sample 
period. 𝑇𝐴𝑋̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the average tax costs of dividend repatriation, calculated according 
Equation 1, during the period 2006-2008. 
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Table 3: Can tax costs of dividend repatriation explain cash-holdings? OLS regressions based on the sample of Japanese overseas 
affiliates 
Dependent Var. 
ln 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
 
 2006-2008 2009-2013 2006-2008 2009-2013 2006-2008 2009-2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑗,𝑡 3.139*** 1.655** 5.896*** 3.544*** 0.135 0.167 0.073 0.108** 
 
(0.663) (0.674) (0.664) (0.666) (0.100) (0.106) (0.046) (0.044) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
-0.139*** 
 
-0.162*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
  
(0.014) 
 
(0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
-1.992*** 
 
-1.766*** -0.297*** -0.295*** -0.150*** -0.145*** 
  
(0.268) 
 
(0.212) (0.035) (0.027) (0.016) (0.012) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
1.561*** 
 
1.799*** 0.535*** 0.373*** 0.233*** 0.190*** 
  
(0.354) 
 
(0.271) (0.082) (0.053) (0.030) (0.020) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
-0.542* 
 
-0.817*** -0.071 -0.099*** -0.049*** -0.058*** 
  
(0.314) 
 
(0.287) (0.047) (0.035) (0.018) (0.015) 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.087** -0.005 -0.012* -0.002 -0.006** 
  
(0.050) 
 
(0.037) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) 
∆𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 
-0.023 
 
0.017 -0.008** -0.005 -0.004** -0.001 
  
(0.024) 
 
(0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 
 
0.098*** 
 
0.032*** 0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
  
(0.025) 
 
(0.012) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,270 4,270 9,660 9,660 4,270 9,660 4,270 9,660 
R-squared 0.182 0.256 0.180 0.273 0.185 0.171 0.241 0.237 
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Notes: This table reports estimation results based on Equation 2. 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑗,𝑡 measures the tax costs of repatriation as specified in Equation 1. For the period 2009-2013, 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑗,𝑡 is measured as if Japan did not move from the worldwide to the territorial tax system. We use the natural logarithm of the cash-net assets ratio as the 
dependent variable in Columns 1-4, the level of the cash-net assets ratio as the dependent variable in Columns 5-6, and the level of the cash-total assets ratio as the 
dependent variable in Columns 7-8. Clustered and robust standard errors are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Do Japanese overseas affiliates of MNCs hold less cash after the territorial tax 
system reform? Cash-rich versus cash-poor affiliates, and high tax versus low tax 
countries. 
Dependent Var.  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 OLS WG OLS WG 
          
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖  2.455*** 
   
 
(0.098) 
   𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖  -0.473*** -0.296*** 
  
 
(0.092) (0.051) 
  𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖  
  
0.377** 
 
   
(0.148) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖  
  
0.042 -0.085 
   
(0.091) (0.071) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.089*** -0.232*** -0.140*** -0.271*** 
 
(0.015) (0.081) (0.021) (0.083) 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.788*** -2.523*** -1.495*** -2.540*** 
 
(0.261) (0.422) (0.321) (0.423) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.979*** 1.332*** 1.361*** 1.462*** 
 
(0.342) (0.265) (0.386) (0.270) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.353 0.109 -0.900** 0.133 
 (0.357) (0.345) (0.400) (0.348) 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.067 -0.006 -0.055 -0.008 
 
(0.047) (0.037) (0.054) (0.037) 
∆𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.016 -0.003 0.003 -0.001 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 0.059*** -0.003 0.061*** 0.007 
 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.020) (0.006) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes No Yes No 
Firm FE No Yes No Yes 
Number of groups 971 971 971 971 
Observations 7,470 7,625 7,470 7,625 
R-squared 0.449 0.029 0.283 0.023 
Notes: HighCash is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a Japanese affiliate’s average ln(cash-assets ratio) during 
2006-2008 is above the corresponding sample median, and 0 otherwise. POST is a dummy that equals 1 for 
years after 2008. HighTax is a dummy that equals 1 if the repatriation tax costs back to Japan during 2006-2008 
from a host country are above the corresponding sample median. Clustered and robust standard errors are in 
brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.A: Comparison of the cash-assets ratio between Japanese and US 
overseas affiliates, OLS regressions 
 
Dependent Var.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝑙𝑛
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
 
Full sample 
High 
repatriation 
costs 
Low 
repatriation 
costs Cash-rich Cash-poor 
          
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 0.553*** 0.169 0.639*** 0.113* 0.483*** 
 
(0.082) (0.137) (0.100) (0.062) (0.108) 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 0.064 0.040 0.069 0.152** 0.051 
 
(0.059) (0.102) (0.071) (0.072) (0.093) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.294*** -0.258*** -0.316*** -0.162*** -0.107*** 
 
(0.027) (0.046) (0.034) (0.024) (0.034) 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -1.836*** -2.004*** -1.609*** -1.570*** -0.570** 
 
(0.204) (0.280) (0.281) (0.273) (0.239) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 1.874*** 1.927*** 1.813*** 1.590*** -0.068 
 
(0.242) (0.297) (0.330) (0.212) (0.340) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.432** -0.166 -0.446* -0.300 0.115 
 (0.204) (0.334) (0.240) (0.198) (0.258) 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.023 -0.040 0.063 -0.166*** 0.150*** 
 
(0.041) (0.060) (0.051) (0.042) (0.058) 
∆𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.002 -0.023 0.008 -0.018* -0.019 
 
(0.012) (0.019) (0.014) (0.010) (0.019) 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 0.014* 0.001 0.055*** 0.029*** -0.010 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.011) 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻,𝑡 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 0.017 -0.025 
 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.018) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Host-country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 3,623 1,024 2,599 1,784 1,839 
Observations 27,801 7,839 19,962 13,682 14,119 
R-squared 0.183 0.252 0.183 0.158 0.106 
Notes: Clustered and robust standard errors are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.B: Comparison of the cash-assets ratio between Japanese and US 
overseas affiliates, within-groups regressions 
 
Dependent Var.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝑙𝑛
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
 
Full sample 
High 
repatriation 
costs 
Low 
repatriation 
costs Cash-rich Cash-poor 
          
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 0.091 0.037 0.108 0.161** 0.088 
 
(0.058) (0.099) (0.070) (0.070) (0.091) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.032 0.017 0.034 -0.015 0.197** 
 
(0.053) (0.083) (0.068) (0.064) (0.082) 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -2.036*** -2.200*** -1.923*** -2.834*** -1.191*** 
 
(0.240) (0.335) (0.339) (0.358) (0.309) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.713*** 0.725*** 0.686*** 0.806*** 0.349 
 
(0.152) (0.217) (0.203) (0.181) (0.250) 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.193 -0.203 -0.196 -0.005 -0.251 
 (0.154) (0.287) (0.175) (0.232) (0.195) 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.071*** -0.044 -0.081** -0.140*** -0.011 
 
(0.027) (0.048) (0.032) (0.036) (0.038) 
∆𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.016** -0.031** -0.009 -0.018* -0.006 
 
(0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 0.017** 0.002 0.055*** 0.033*** -0.007 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010) 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻,𝑡 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.016 -0.023 
 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of groups 3,623 1,024 2,599 1,784 1,839 
Observations 28,439 8,026 20,413 14,016 14,423 
Notes: Clustered and robust standard errors are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Comparison of financing patterns between Japanese and US overseas affiliates 
 
Dependent Var.  
𝐿𝑇 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
 
(𝐿𝑇 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑆𝑇 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
 
(𝐿𝑇 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑆𝑇 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)
(𝐿𝑇 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑆𝑇 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ)
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
OLS WG OLS WG OLS WG 
             
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 -0.016*** 
 
0.003 
 
0.008 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.009) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.006 -0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.006*** 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.047*** 0.018*** 0.058*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.095*** 0.068*** 0.129*** 0.099*** 0.165*** 0.163*** 
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.028) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.080*** -0.050*** -0.226*** -0.145*** -0.377*** -0.259*** 
 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.021) (0.016) 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻,𝑡 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Host countries dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of groups 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 3,659 
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Observations 27,928 28,600 27,928 28,600 27,928 28,600 
R-squared 0.158 0.016 0.282 0.045 0.247 0.050 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results based on Equation 8, which compares the leverage ratio of Japanese overseas affiliates with that 
of similar US overseas affiliates. We focus on host countries where we observe both Japanese and US overseas affiliates. Clustered and robust 
standard errors are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1: Evolution of the cash-net assets ratio of Japanese overseas affiliates 
during the period 2006-2013, unbalanced and balanced samples 
 
Notes: 
Figure 1 plots the average cash-net assets ratio of Japanese overseas affiliates for an unbalanced 
panel (those with non-missing observations during 2006-2011, but may not report observations in 
2012 or 2013) and a strongly balanced panel (non-missing observations during 2006-2013) 
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the cash-net assets ratio of Japanese overseas affiliates 
located in countries with low or high repatriation tax costs  
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Notes: Figure 2B is obtained by first collecting residuals from regressing the cash-net assets ratio 
on the full set of industry dummies in an OLS regression, and then regressing the residuals on a 
full set of year dummies for affiliates located in low and high repatriation cost countries, 
respectively. We plot the estimated coefficients on the full set of year dummies for the two groups 
of affiliates here. 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of leverage ratio of Japanese overseas affiliates 
 
Notes: Leverage ratio in Figure 3 is defined as the ratio of long-term debt in net assets. 
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Figure 4: Evolution of non-fixed assets of Japanese overseas affiliates 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of the cash-net asset ratio of Japanese overseas affiliates 
during 2006-2013 
  
Notes: Figure 5 plots the average cash-net assets ratio for cash-rich and cash-poor Japanese 
affiliates. An affiliate is defined as rich in cash if its average cash-assets ratio during 2006-2008 is 
above the corresponding sample median.  
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Figure 6: Cash-net assets ratios of Japanese and US overseas affiliates  
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Figure 7: Leverage ratio of Japanese and US overseas affiliates 
 
Notes: Leverage ratio in Figure 7 is defined as the ratio of long-term debt in net assets. 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Compare Japanese affiliates located in countries with low or high 
repatriation tax costs 
 
In this Appendix, we compare Japanese affiliates located in countries with low or high 
repatriation costs in terms of firm size (proxied by the natural logarithm of revenue), 
profitability, tangibility, growth rate of revenue, and growth rate of fixed assets. 
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Appendix B: Compare Japanese and US overseas affiliates 
 
In this appendix, we compare Japanese and US overseas affiliates in terms of GDP 
growth rate of the home country, firm size, profitability, tangibility, growth rate of 
revenue and growth rate of fixed assets.  
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